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232 FOLEY t'. SONOMA COUNTY ETC. INS. Co. [18 C. (2d) 
court, they would not be sufficient to make further findings, 
but they cannot be said to be properly before this court. No 
bill of exceptions was presented or settled. No notice for the 
preparation or filing of a transcript of evidence under the 
provisions of section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure was 
given. The exhibits were not a part of the pleadings and 
therefore cannot be considered a part of the judgment roll. 
The conclusion of law that the attempted location for appel-
lant by Dean was void and the judgment quieting title in 
favor of respondent Myrtle Griffith are based solely on the 
finding of fact that Dean was acting in a dual capacity and 
contrary to the best interests of his original cestui que trust, 
the Sierra Syndicate. For the reasons previously discussed 
it cannot be said that the judgment is supported by the find-
ings. This conclusion being sufficient to require a reversal 
of the judgment, there is no necessity for a consideration of 
appellant's second contention to the effect that a lessee is 
estopped from questioning his landlord's title. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., pro tem., 
and Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 5464. In Bank.-July 3, 1941.] 
ELLEN FOLEY et al., Respondents, v. THE SONOMA 
C.OUNTY FARMERS' MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF SONOMA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 
(a Corporation), Appellant. 
[la, lb] Insurance-Avoidance of Policy-Alteration in Use or 
Occupancy-Temporary Absence.-A dwelling is not unoccu-
pied so as to suspend a fire insurance policy where the occu-
pants, leaving their furniture and furnishings intact, absent 
themselves for approximately two weeks for the purpose of 
visiting. A person's dwelling does not cease to be occupied 
when he is temporarily absent therefrom. 
1. See 14 Oal. Jur. 518; 29 Am. Jur. 539. 
MeR:. Dig. References: 1-4. Insurance, § 137. 
I 
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[2] Id.-Avoidance of Policy-Alteration in Use or Occupancy_ 
Vacancy and Nonoccupancy Distinguished.-Under a fire in-
suratlce policy provision relieving the insurer for loss occur-
ring while the building "is vacant or unoccupied beyond the 
period· of ten consecutive days,"· the terms "vacant" and 
"unoccupied" are used as alternatives. The term "vacant" is 
associated with removal of inanimate objects from a dwell-
ing, whereas the term "unoccupied" is associated with the 
abandonment of 'the dwelling as a customary abode by its 
former occupants. 
[3] Id.-Avoidance of PolicY-Alteration in Use or Occupancy_ 
Test of Occupancy.-It is neither the physical presence of 
inanimate objects alone, nor the physical presence of human 
occupants alone which characterizes an occupied dwelling, 
within the meaning of an insurance policy. It is the habitual 
use of the inanimate objects by the human occupants that 
animates the dwelling and renders it occupied, that trans-
forms four walls into a home. 
[4] Id.-Avoidance of PolicY-Alteration in Use or Occupancy_ 
Effect of PrOvision as to Duration.-In a provision for sus-
pension of insurance while the building is unoccupied "be-
yond the period of ten consecutive days," the quoted words 
do not affect the meaning of the word "unoccupied." Far 
from imposing a limitation on temporary absences, the words 
have the effect of continuing the operation of the policy for 
an additional ten days in the event the dwelling is rendered 
unoccupied through. its abandonment as a customary abode 
by its former occupants. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Sonoma County, Hilliard c.omstock, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Action on policy of fire insurance. Judgment for plaintiff 
affirmed. 
Geary & Tauzer, J. N. De Meo and A. Dal Thomson for 
Appellant. 
Rutherford, Rutherford & Rutherford and Wallace Ruther-
ford for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of the 
trial court in favor of plaintiff, Ellen Foley, in an action 
Upon a policy of fire insurance. 
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The defendant issued to Ellen Foley a "California Stand-
ard Form of County Fire Insurance Policy" covering a 
dwelling house in Sonoma County and furniture,. family 
stores, wearing apparel and like articles within the dwelling 
house for the period from October 17, 1933 to October 17, 
1936. The policy contains a clause that: "Unless otherwise 
provided by agreement indorsed hereon, or added hereto this 
company shall not be liable for loss or damage occurring ... 
while a building herein described, whether intended for oc-
cupation by owner or tenant is vacant or unoccupied beyond 
the period of ten consecutive days." The present case con-
cerns only the insurance on the furniture and other described 
articles since the policy, so far as it concerned the house, 
was assigned with the consent of the defendant to the vendees 
to whom plaintiffs on April 20, 1934, conveyed the real prop-
erty under an agreement by which the plaintiffs were to 
occupy the house for a period of three and one-half years 
without the payment of rent. 
[ia] On October 15, 1934, the plaintiffs left the premises 
with the intention of remaining away three or four days in 
order to visit a daughter in Pittsburg, California. The plain-
tiffs there decided to visit another daughter in Stockton, Cali-
fornia. On the evening of October 28, 1934, while they were 
still at Stockton, the dwelling house and the personal prop-
erty contained therein were destroyed by a fire of unknown 
origin. 
It was stipulated that there was no notice to, or consent by, 
the defendant, concerning the plaintiffs' departure from the 
premises. At the time of the fire, the plaintiffs had been 
away from the premises from the fifteenth to the twenty-
eighth of October, a period of thirteen days. Defendant con-
tends that their absence during that period rendered the 
dwelling unoccupied and served to suspend the operation of 
the policy under the clause relieving the defendant of lia-
bility in the event the dwelling is vacant or unoccupied for 
more than ten consecutive days. 
[2] A dwelling lUay be unoccupied even though it is not 
vacant; the terms are neither synonymous nor complemen-
tary. They are used in the present clause as alternatives and 
not in conjunction. T):le term "vacant" is associated with 
removal of inanimate objects from a dwelling; the term "un-
occupied" is associated with the abandonment of that dwell-
ing as a customary abode by its former occupants. (See 
r 
I 
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cases collected in 43 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 344-
355; 26 Corpus Juris 213; 14 R. C. L. 1103.) 
In the present case the question of vacancy does not arise 
as there was no removal of inanimate objects from the dwell-
ing. The occupants left their furniture and furnishings in-
tact, thus corroborating their avowed intention of returning 
to them within a few days. The issue therefore turns lipon 
the meaning of unoccupied. [3] The vacancy of a dwelling 
does much to strengthen the conclusion that it is unoccupied, 
as . the presence of furnishings does much to strengthen the 
conclusion that it is occupied. But a dwelling that is not va-
cant is not necessarily occupied, and inanimate objects cannot 
of themselves render a dwelling occupied. It is neither the 
physical presence of inanimate objects alone, nor the physical 
presence of human occupants alone that characterizes an 
occupied dwelling. It is the habitual use of the inanimate 
objects by the human occupants that animates the dwelling 
and renders it occupied, that transforms four walls into a 
home. In such a home the human occupants move freely in 
and out so that their physical presence within four walls is 
rarely continuous. 
[ib] Recognizing the dynamic relationship of human be-
ings to their dwellings, courts throughout the country have 
held that temporary absence of the occupants does not render 
a dwelling unoccupied. "To constitute occupancy of a dwell-
ing house, it is not essential that it be continuously used bya 
family. The family may be absent from it for health, plea-
sure, business or convenience, for reasonable periods, and the 
house will not, on that account, be considered as vacant or 
unoccupied." (Moody v. Amazon Ins. 00., 52 Ohio, 12 [38 
N. E. 1011, 1013, 49 Am. St. Rep. 699, 26 L. R. A. 313].) "A 
mere temporary absence of the occupants from the premises, 
there being an intention to return, will not render the build· 
ing unoccupied, so as to void the policy." (Republic Ins. 00. 
v. Watson (Tex. Civ. App.), 70 S. W. (2d) 441, 443.) "The 
authorities without a single exception agree that a dwelling 
house will not be regarded as occupied unless it is the home 
or dwelling place of some person living and sleeping there 
habitually, not every night, but usually and ordinarily, who 
when temporarily absent, returns to it as a place of abode." 
(Oontinental Ins. 00. of New York v. D-unning, 249 Ky. 234 
[60 S. W. (2d) 577, 579]. See also, Snyder v. Fireman~s 
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Fund Ins. Co., 78 Iowa, 146 [42 N~ W. 630, 631] ; Hill v. Ohio 
Ins. Co., 99 Mich. 466 [58 N. W. 359] ; Herrmann v. Adriatic 
Fire Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 162, 167[39 Am. Rep. 644]; Williams 
v. Pioneer Co-op. Fire Ins. Co., 183 App. Div. 826 [171 N. Y. 
Supp. 353, 355] ; Smith v. Aetna Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 269 
S. W. 682, 685; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Peyson, 54 Neb. 495 
[74 N. W. 960] ; cf. Kinneer v. Southwestern Mutual Fire 
Assn., 322 Pa. 100 [185 Atl. 194] ; Hudson Ins. Co. v. Mc-
I(night et al.(Tex. Civ. App.), 58 S. W. (2d) 1088.) 
It is thus generally accepted that a person's dwelling con-
stitutes not the boundaries but the focal point of his life. 
He does not cease to have a home when he is temporarily ab-
sent' therefrom, nor does his home cease to be an occupied 
dwelling. It is not his physical presence but the habitual re-
currence of that presence' that renders a dwelling occupied. 
(See cases collected in 43 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.), 
344-355; 26 Corpus Juris 213; 14 R. C. L. 1103; Mauck v. 
N. W.' N ationallns. Co., 102 Cal. App. 510 [283 Pac. 338] ; 
Covey v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 31 CaL App. 579 [161 
Pac. 35].) 
[4] Defendant concedes that if there is no clause specify-
ing how long a dwelling may be unoccupied the term unoccU-
pied is not identified with the temporary absence of the occu-
pants. It seeks, however, to make that identification when the 
period of nonoccupancy is specified. There is no more basis 
for such an identification in the second instance than in the 
first, for specifications as to the period of. nonoccupancy set 
no limits on the periods of temporary absence. The term un-
occupied is not thereby redefined and under its customary 
definition it does not characterize the dwelling in question. 
The insurance covered a dwelling and the personal property 
therein provided the dwelling be not unoccupied "beyond the 
period of 10 conseeutive days." The introduction of this 
phrase can no more change the meaning of the termunoccu-
pied than it can change the meaning of the terms dwelling or 
personal property. Far from imposing a limitation on tempo-
rary absences it has the effect of continuing the operation of 
the policy for an additional ten days in the event the dwell-
ing is rendered unoc,cupied through its abandonment as a 
customary abode by its former occupants. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Curtis, J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Edmonds, J., Spence, J., 
pro tern., and Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
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[L. A. No. 17435. In Bank.-July 16, 1941.] 
Estate of EMELINE CHILDS, Deceased. EMELINE 
CHILDS DWIGHT et al., Appellants, v. HARRY B. 
RILEY, as State Controller, etc., Respondent. 
[la, 1 b] Taxation~Inheritance Taxation-Prospective or Retro-
spective Operation-Aggregation of Transfers-As Affected 
by-Date of Transfers.-Where there were transfers by a de-
cedent at various times between 1920 and his death in 1935, 
it was not error of which the transferees could complain for 
the trial court to aggregate the transfers inter vivos and at 
death, to allow but one exemption in an amount authorized 
by the 1917 Inheritance Tax Act, and as to rates to apply 
such act as to transfers inter vivos, and the 1935 act to trans-
fers at death. In so doing, the'court did not give retroactive 
effect to the 1935 act or to any law, since the provision as 
to aggregation, save for the latter part added in 1935, is a 
mere continuation of the law in force since 1917. 
[2] Statutes-Repeal-Simultaneous Repeal and Re-enactment.-
Where repealing acts embrace provisions of prior repealed 
acts, the new acts are re-enactments and there is a continua-
tion of the provisions carried over without alteration. 
[3] Taxation - Inheritance Taxation - Imposition - Valuation -
Aggregation in C3$e of Several Transfers-Statutory Con-
struction.-In the provision of the Inheritance Tax Act of 
1935 (Stats. 1935, p. 1266, § 2 (10), Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1937, Act 8495) relating to the aggregation of value in case 
of more than one taxable transfer-which is a mere re-enact-
ment and continuation of prior provisions-the words 
"either before or after the passage of this act" refer to the 
passage of the 1917 act where the provision originally ap-
peared. 
[4] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Imposition-Valuation-Aggrega-
tion in Case of Several Transfers-Effect on Exemption and 
Rate.-The aggregation of market value of property trans-
ferred in case of more than one transfer, as directed by the 
Inheritance Tax Act of 1935, § 2 (10) (Stats. 1935, p. 1266, 
Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8495), has the effect of restrict-
1. See 28 Am. Jur. 40. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Taxation, § 416; 2. Statutes, § 95 (3) ; 
3, 4, 8. Taxat'ion, § 441; 5., Taxation, § 424; 6. Constitutional Law, 
§ 52; 7. Constitutional Law, § 64; 9. Statutes, § 95 (2); 10. Stat-
utes, § 24. 
